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Abstract  
Time pressure is a central aspect of economic decision making nowadays. It is therefore 
natural to ask how time pressure affects decisions, and how to detect individual 
heterogeneity in the ability to successfully cope with time pressure. In the context of 
risky decisions, we ask whether a person’s performance under time pressure can be 
predicted by measurable behavior and traits, and whether such measurement itself may be 
affected by selection issues. We find that the ability to cope with time pressure varies 
significantly across decision makers, leading to selected subgroups that differ in terms of 
their observed behaviors and personal traits. Moreover, measures of cognitive ability and 
intellectual efficiency jointly predict individuals’ decision quality and ability to keep their 
decision strategy under time pressure.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many, if not most, decisions in the workplace are made under time pressure today (Reid 
and Ramarajan, 2016; Wheatley, 2000). Consequently, research in decision making has 
recently started to investigate how a time constraint influences individuals’ preferences 
and choices (for an overview, Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2017). By randomly allocating 
subjects into time pressure conditions, the literature has successfully identified its causal 
effects in a variety of domains, including risky, social, and strategic behavior (e.g., Sutter 
et al., 2003, on bargaining; Kocher and Sutter, 2006, on beauty contests; Baillon et al., 
2013, on decisions under ambiguity; Kirchler et al., 2017, on risky decisions; Buckert et 
al., 2017, on imitation in strategic games; Haji et al., 2016, on bidding in auctions).  
 However, these causal effects should be interpreted with caution, because of two 
potentially serious problems, both relating to issues of self-selection. First, because 
people differ in their ability to cope with time pressure (e.g., Claessens et. al., 2007; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Maruping et al., 2015, and references therein), we expect people self-
select into decision environments with a different degree of time pressure. That is, 
outside the experimental laboratory, candidates self-select into activities and occupations 
and thus into job-related decision-making environments. In contrast, participants in 
experiments are exogenously assigned to treatment conditions that may not fit well with 
their tastes and skills (Omar and List, 2015). External validity of the observed 
experimental behavior thus cannot be taken for granted. Despite similarity of the 
experimental and the natural decision environments (in term of time pressure), the 
decision makers may systematically differ across the two settings in a self-selected way. 
Importantly, while external validity is an issue in any empirical study, it is a more central 
aspect in laboratory experiments that explicitly aim to mimic natural decision 
environments.1 Understanding the personal traits associated with the ability to perform 
under time pressure would allow an assessment of selection in the field, and thus of the 
external validity of average causal effects based on the distribution of traits in actual 
decision environments. Identifying such traits is one aim of the current paper. 
                                                 
1 External validity may be less of a problem in other contexts, for example time-limited offers to consumers 
(Sugden et al., 2015), where self-selection is less likely. 
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 Second, if time pressure is substantial and relevant in an experiment, some people 
will violate the time constraint. This leads to problems of the internal, rather than the 
external validity of the time pressure effects, because the sample of decisions observed in 
the data set is self-selected.2 Failure to take these selection effects into account may 
therefore result in a false interpretation of the observed behavior in terms of population 
averages. For example, Tinghög et al. (2013) argue that failures to replicate time pressure 
effects on cooperation in ethical dilemmas (Rand et al., 2012) may be due to the original 
studies excluding about half of the participants because of a failure to meet the time 
constraint (Casari et al., 2007, make a similar observation in the context of auction 
bidding).  
 The current study aims to shed light on such heterogeneity and the resulting selection 
effects in the presence of exogenously imposed time pressure. To this end, we separately 
analyze subsamples of subjects who fail, respectively succeed, to react in time, in terms 
of their behavior and traits. We demonstrate that overlooking the selection issue in this 
context would result in a very different assessment of the performance under time 
pressure. We focus on the domain of risky decisions. In appendix A.1., we review the 
findings of the experimental literature in this domain. We indicate for each study whether 
there is a potential threat to internal validity because of substantial violations of the time 
constraints, or whether there is low time pressure, questioning relevance. Table A1 
suggests that selection problems should be taken seriously in the interpretation of causal 
time pressure effects on risk taking.   
 Observing that selection issues are at the heart of experiments with time pressure and 
other adverse conditions, we are the first to (1) directly measure the empirical relevance 
of selection effects and (2) test whether there are individual-level correlates based on 
observable background variables that can be used as predictors for the ability of a 
decision maker to cope with time pressure, and thus the propensity to self-select into 
time-pressure environments. The fact that decision makers differ in their ability to deal 
with time pressure requires us to predict this ability if we aim to ensure that decision 
                                                 
2 A similar problem exists in studies on the effect of stress on decision making, where analyses of data are 
typically restricted to those participants who show a cortisol reaction under stress (Trautmann, 2014).  
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makers are allocated to environments in an efficient way.3 We use the term time pressure 
resistance for such ability. It relates to differences in the decision process, including the 
decision maker’s time management. Our study aims to provide insights into these 
processes, and how they differ between decision makers. To this end, we collect data on 
risky decisions under time pressure, augmenting a design used in Kocher et al. (2013) to 
allow for both between-subject and within-subject analyses of behavior across time-
constrained conditions. That is, we observe each decision maker’s risky choice behavior 
both in the presence and in the absence of time pressure for a similar set of risky 
alternatives. 
 To test whether individual differences predict decision quality under time pressure, 
we assess participants’ scores on a measure of cognitive ability, on a measure of 
intellectual efficiency, and a set of personality traits. Importantly, while performance 
under time pressure can be measured in many ways, a risky decision task requires 
complex reasoning and has no obvious solution from the perspective of the decision 
maker (because optimal choices depend on preferences). Consequently, the decision 
maker has to choose a decision strategy, and this strategy may be affected by time 
pressure (Ordóñez and Benson, 1997). Our performance measures aim to detect such 
shifts in strategy. The details of the experimental design, including our measures of 
cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency are described in the next section. 
 Employing this design to study person-environment interactions in the context of 
time pressure, we observe the following results. First, we observe clear differences in 
decision styles across people in the absence of time pressure, which are then associated 
with the success in mastering the time constraint when it is present. That is, selection is 
highly relevant for internal validity. Second, in attempting to then predict the ability to 
perform under time pressure, we find that those who score high in cognitive measures 
and have high self-efficacy perform better and are less likely to miss the deadline, 
although cognitive measures only possess predictive power jointly. Moreover, 
individuals’ decision style (defined below) in the absence of time pressure correlates with 
                                                 
3E.g. HR managers of investments firms should be able to predict the ability to resist time pressure of 
prospective traders when making hiring decisions. 
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performance under time pressure. Yet, we note that there is still an important role of 
unobserved factors. We discuss the implications of our findings for the external validity 
of time pressure effects in decision making in the wild.    
 
 
2. STUDYING SELF-SELECTION IN AN ADVERSE TIME-PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT: 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We implement an experimental structure that allows us to observe both between- and 
within-subject differences in risky decision-making behavior in a time-constrained versus 
an unconstrained environment. This is how we can causally identify the effects of time 
pressure on risky decision making at the individual level. As decision makers are likely to 
show different reactions to adverse decision environments, we measure potentially 
selection-relevant individual characteristics that may explain these differences. We can, 
for instance, examine how time pressure affects different groups of people, say people 
who can vis-à-vis those who cannot cope with time pressure, and provide insights into 
their behaviors absent time pressure. Within time pressure or no time pressure conditions 
we can also correlate personal traits with our performance measures to understand why 
some people can cope with time pressure better than others.  
 More specifically, for each participant we observe (i) risky choices in the absence of 
time pressure; (ii) risky choices in the presence of time pressure; (iii) a measure of 
cognitive ability (“IQ”); and (iv) a measure of intellectual efficiency (“IE”). We discuss 
the different tasks and measures in detail below. The general structure of the experiment 
carefully counterbalances the order of the different parts as shown in Table 1. The setup 
allows us to test the hypotheses (1) that those who violate the time constraint under time 
pressure make substantially different choices in the absence of time pressure; and (2) that 
behavior under the adverse influence of time pressure is predicted by decision makers’ 
behavior in the absence of time pressure and their observable traits.  
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Table 1: Treatment Design 
Treatment 
(#obs) 
Part 1: Indiv. 
Differences 
Part 2: Risky 
Choices Set 1 
Part 3: Risky 
Choices Set 2a 
Part 4: Indiv. 
Differences  
1 (93) IQ Time pressure No time pressure IE 
2 (94) IQ No time pressure Time pressure IE 
3 (96) IE Time pressure No time pressure IQ 
4 (96) IE No time pressure Time pressure IQ 
Notes: IQ: measurement of cognitive ability; IE: measurement of intellectual efficiency; a: a set of pure 
gain choices was added after Set 2 to give subjects the possibility to earn back potential losses in sets 1 and 
2 (see section 2.3). Note that the IQ and IE tasks allowed subjects to move back and forth across items 
while this was not possible in the risky choice tasks.    
 
 Each set of risky choices (Set 1 and Set 2) consisted of 24 binary choices (see Table 
A2 in the appendix for a full description). Time pressure was imposed by setting time 
limits for each of two 12-item subsets of choices within each of these two sets of risky 
choices. In particular, each set consisted of (i) one subset of 12 binary choices that 
compared pure loss lotteries with mixed lotteries of lower expected value (“prominent 
gain”); and (ii) one subset of 12 binary choices that compared pure gain lotteries with 
mixed lotteries of higher expected value (“prominent loss”). A detailed description and 
motivation of these choice tasks is given in Section 2.3.4 An important feature of the time 
pressure implementation is that the time limit was imposed on the subset level, not on 
each choice item.5 That is, participants could go through the items in each subset at their 
own pace and therefore had to organize the allocation of time to the different choices 
efficiently. However, subjects were not allowed to go back and reconsider earlier choices. 
                                                 
4 Because losses were possible in the lottery choices, we included another set of lottery choices after the 
main task (Set 2 / Part 3) that gave subjects the possibility to earn back any losses from sets 1 or 2. See 
section 2.3 for details. 
5 Both forms of time pressure are commonly observed in real-life and therefore important to study. Gabaix 
et al. (2006) offer a good analogy of these two forms of time pressure in a context of a shopper at Walmart: 
time pressure imposed on individual items is analogue to buying a TV while considering its many 
attributes; time pressure imposed on set levels is similar to a situation where the shopper wants to buy other 
products (each with different attributes) within her time budget.  
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In contrast to situations where time pressure is imposed on individual items, varying time 
pressure at the subset level adds an additional layer of complexity: Decision makers have 
to simultaneously allocate their time budget to the respective items, while considering the 
decision problem in the face of time pressure. This allows us to identify time 
management abilities and strategies to cope with time pressure of those who violate the 
time limit, and those who do not.  
 To make time pressure and no time pressure conditions as similar as possible in the 
presentation of the instructions and the task design, the unconstrained task also involved a 
time limit. However, this limit was selected such that it would not provide a binding 
constraint for subjects, namely at 420 seconds in all subsets. The extent of the time 
constraint in the time pressure conditions was calibrated in pre-test sessions such that 
there would be significant time pressure, while not making it impossible for the subjects 
to perform the decision task. In particular, under time pressure, the time limits were set at 
120 seconds for the set with the prominent gains and at 80 seconds for the set with the 
prominent losses. In both cases, this value implied a 20% reduction of the median 
decision times in the absence of constraints that we observed in six pilot sessions (details 
about the pre-test sessions are given in the Web Appendix6).  
  
 
2.1 Cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency 
We employed Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) test to measure cognitive 
ability (“IQ”) and intellectual efficiency (“IE”). Cognitive ability assesses a subject’s 
cognitive reasoning power, i.e. the extent to which complex information can be 
processed. Intellectual efficiency measures cognitive reasoning speed, i.e. how fast 
incoming information can be processed (Raven et al., 1998). We hypothesized that IQ 
positively predicts decision quality, whereas lower IE predicts increases in the likelihood 
to violate the time constraint. 
  
                                                 
6 The web appendix is available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/61xvk4izh3flt9l/KSTX_webappendix_march9_2018_final.pdf?dl=0    
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Figure 1: A Sample Screen from Raven’s APM 
 
 Cognitive ability constitutes a non-verbal estimate of fluid intelligence, the ability to 
reason and solve novel problems. Individuals with high fluid ability are thought to be 
able to better cope with time pressure, because they typically possess larger working 
memory (Shelton et al., 2010). In addition, De Paola and Gioia (2016) report that 
cognitive ability has a positive impact on performance under time pressure. Intellectual 
efficiency in turn imposes exogenous time pressure on the problem, such that we expect 
cognitive ability to be positively related to decision quality (defined in section 3), but 
intellectual efficiency to be predictive for the ability to complete all necessary decisions 
when time is scarce. 
 Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices are aimed at subjects in the high cognitive 
ability ranges such as university students. In each item, subjects were presented with a 3-
by-3 matrix of abstract symbols, with the symbol in the lower right corner missing. They 
were asked to choose, among eight possible alternatives, the one that completed the 
pattern in the matrix. We communicated to subjects that the items in the task were 
arranged in ascending order of difficulty and that they could go back and forth within the 
(possibly non-binding) time limit to revise their answers. An example can be seen in 
Figure 1, where the correct answer is option 3. 
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 Instead of running the full 48-item test, a short-form7 containing 12 selected items 
from the APM test was administered to obtain a measure of IQ, as it has been argued that 
conducting the full APM does not add much predictive power (the correlation between 
the two formats is 𝜌 = 0.88, see Bors and Stokes, 1998). As we are interested in the 
cognitive capacities of subjects, we allowed subjects to answer all twelve items at their 
own pace. To keep instructions as close as possible to our measure of intellectual 
efficiency (details below), we implemented a non-binding time constraint of 25 minutes, 
which was again calibrated in pre-tests. 
 We used the remaining 34 items 8  from the APM to construct a measure of 
intellectual efficiency, i.e. the speed of cognitive reasoning, following Raven et al. (1998, 
Section 4, APM15ff.) and Yates (1966). By imposing a severe time limit on subjects (13 
minutes to solve all 34 items), we measure how fast and how efficiently they can process 
information. They could again reconsider earlier choices at any time. The timing 
constraint proved to be binding in pre-tests: no participant was able to finish all questions 
within the time limit.  
 Based on the tasks, we define our measures IQ and IE as the number of correct items 
in the cognitive ability and the intellectual efficiency tasks, respectively. There was no 
additional reduction of the score for wrong answers or missing items. Note that, as shown 
in Table 1, the IQ and IE tasks were counterbalanced separately for each ordering of the 
time pressure tasks. The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized such that (1) a higher score 
yielded a higher chance to win a monetary prize, and (2) subjects could never identify 
their number of correct answers exactly. We provide more details on the rationale and the 
procedure in Appendix A.4. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The short form of the APM test we used here was introduced by Bors and Stokes (1998), consisting of 
items 3, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 30, 31, and 34 of the APM (Set II). It is more difficult, and therefore 
suits university students better, than the other short version proposed earlier by Arthur and Day (1994). 
8 We used the first two items in Set I of the APM test as instructional items, leaving 34 items for our 
intellectual efficiency measure. The items’ increasing difficulty was taken into account by preserving the 
items’ ordering. 
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2.2 Personality measures 
At the end of the experiment, we elicited several personality measures that have often 
been linked to decision making (e.g., Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010), and are potentially 
relevant to the ability of coping with time pressure. The Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale 
(Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995) is a ten-item questionnaire which aims at measuring the 
“belief in one’s competence to tackle novel tasks and to cope with adversity in a broad 
range of stressful or challenging encounters” (Luszczynska et al., 2005, p. 80). Time 
pressure is thus a natural environment in which self-efficacy may have an effect on 
decision-making quality. In particular, in line with previous research showing a positive 
correlation between measures of self-efficacy and good financial planning behavior 
(Kuhnen and Melzer, 2014), we hypothesized that higher level of self-efficacy may be 
associated with better decision quality under time pressure. Rotter’s (1966) Locus of 
Control questionnaire is a 28-item survey that assesses the extent to which individuals 
believe that they have control over events that affect them in their lives. Whenever 
individuals feel to be in control, they might be less likely to perceive stress (e.g. 
generated by time pressure) as a threat (Chan, 1977). It has been shown that internally-
oriented individuals are more likely to appraise stressful situations as a controllable 
challenge and focus on coping with stress, while externally-oriented individuals are more 
likely to be threatened by stressors (Bernardi, 1997; Folkman, 1984; Parkes, 1984). We 
therefore hypothesized that stronger internal orientation mitigates the effects of time 
pressure on decision making. A Big Five Ten Item questionnaire, measuring the Big Five 
personality characteristics with ten questions was also administered (see Gosling et al. 
(2003) for a comparison between this inventory and a widely used 44-item inventory). 
Here we predicted that traits such as neuroticism could become a burden under time 
pressure, as previous research has shown that this trait is positively associated with task 
avoidance (Matthews and Campbell, 1998), and Byrne et al. (2015) have found that 
neuroticism is negatively correlated with performance in tasks with social and time 
pressure. Finally, we elicited general demographics and background data. 
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2.3 Risk preference measures  
Our main task involved binary risky choices. We build on the design in Kocher et al. 
(2013), who analyzed risky decisions under time pressure. That study found strong time 
pressure effects for lottery choices involving mixed gambles, i.e., including both gains 
and losses. In particular, under time pressure, decision makers seem to be prone to prefer 
mixed gambles over pure loss gambles with higher expected value (thus being drawn by 
the prominent gain in the mixed gambles); similarly, decision makers seem to prefer pure 
gain gambles over mixed gambles with a higher expected value (thus being repelled by 
the prominent loss in the mixed gamble). Both Saqib and Chan (2015) and Conte et al. 
(2016) find similar prominence effects under time pressure. Because we want to study the 
role of selection effects under time pressure, we deliberately employed this particular 
structure of lottery choices, expecting to induce robust time pressure effects with the 
design. As described before, we presented subjects with two sets of choices, one set being 
time-constrained, and the other de facto unconstrained. Each set consisted of a subset of 
12 choices of the prominent-gain format, and 12 choices of the prominent-loss format. 
The order of the two subsets was fixed, each subject first worked on the subset in the 
prominent-gain format, before moving on to the prominent-loss format. The two subsets 
were separately time-constrained as described above. Within each subset, subjects had to 
proceed through the choice problems in a given order (fixed over all subjects and 
conditions) and could not go back to revise previous choices. A list of all choices is given 
in Appendix A.2. A screenshot of the presentation of the choices is given in Appendix 
A.3. 
 Subjects made as many choices as possible within the time constraint. At the end of 
the experiment, one choice was selected randomly from all the potential choice problems 
in Set 1 and Set 2, and payoffs depended on the decision made, i.e. the lottery chosen, in 
this choice problem (this procedure prevented wealth or house money effects, which we 
considered relevant in the context of risky choice). If a subject violated the time 
constraint and thus failed to answer some of the questions, she would receive the lowest 
possible outcome (i.e., the highest possible loss) if one of the unanswered decision 
problems was selected for payment. This severe form of punishment encouraged subjects 
to always make a decision, and it is a common feature of many real-life decision 
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environments with time pressure (e.g. air traffic control, emergency room doctors).9 For 
example, if the selected choice problem involved a choice between the lottery (15%: -
€15, 85%: -€11) and (15%: €12, 85%: -€17) (see S1 / G11 in Table A2), the earnings for 
a person who did not submit a decision was -€17. 
 Because the risky choices of sets 1 and 2 involved potential losses, we needed to 
endow the participants with sufficient funds to cover any losses they might incur in parts 
2 and 3 of the experiment. Therefore, an additional task was added after Set 2 that 
involved six risky choices between lotteries in which the lowest possible gain amounted 
to €20. By adding the endowment task after all Part 2 and Part 3 choices had been made, 
and by endowing with the help of risky choices, we prevented subjects from integrating 
the endowment easily with the loss outcomes in the choices in earlier parts. This method 
was adapted from Kocher et al. (2013). We did not impose a time limit on the endowment 
task. At the end of the experiment, one of the six choices was randomly selected for 
payment, and earnings were added to earnings from the lottery selected from sets 1 and 2. 
When working on Set 1 and Set 2, subjects were not aware how the subsequent task 
would look like; they only knew that other parts were to follow and that they would not 
incur overall net losses from the experiment. In the analyses below, we always report 
performance based on behavior in sets 1 and 2, thus not incorporating the endowment 
task. 
 
2.4 Laboratory details 
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was 
done with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We conducted 16 experimental sessions at 
the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich in July and September 2014. In 
total, 379 subjects took part in the experiment, up to 24 in each session. 60% of the 
                                                 
9 We intended to study an environment in which failing to meet the time constraint has clear and severe 
consequences. In particular, we wanted to implement a trade-off between making more thoughtful 
decisions and answering all decision problems. We did not want to add risky decision considerations to this 
trade-off by, for example, paying some metric like the expected value or selecting one option randomly. 
We observe that in most real world settings agents do not receive a randomly selected option, or an average 
payment, if they fail to choose in time.   
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subjects were female with an average age of 24 years. They were mostly undergraduate 
and graduate students from the diverse set of programs that the university offers. 10 
Payoffs were determined by randomly selecting one of the four parts for payment, with 
payment details then depending on the procedures described in the previous subsections. 
A typical session lasted for about 75 minutes, and subjects earned on average about 
€16.63 (approximately $21.32 at that time). In addition, we ran several pilot studies in 
Tilburg and Munich to calibrate the appropriate timing constraints. Information on the 
pilots, as well as the experimental instructions, can be found in the Web Appendix.  
 
3. TIME PRESSURE AND RISKY DECISIONS: MANIPULATION CHECK 
We first consider whether the time pressure manipulation for the risky decisions was 
effective in terms of time-use, in terms of the number of participants violating the time 
constraint, and in terms of the number of unanswered decision items. Table 2 shows the 
results using the within-subject comparison.  
 Clearly, subjects made substantially faster decisions under time pressure, were more 
likely to violate the time constraint, and had more missing items. The manipulation of 
time pressure was successful in providing a highly adverse decision environment. 
 
Table 2: Time Pressure Manipulation for Risky Decisions 
Treatment Actual 
time used  
(average, 
in sec.) 
# of 
subjects 
violating 
the time 
constraint 
# of 
missing 
items 
per 
person  
Expected 
value 
(choices 
made; 
€)a,b 
Expected 
value (all 
decision 
problems
; €)a,c 
Percent of 
choices 
avoiding 
prominent 
loss  
Percent of 
choices 
seeking 
prominent 
gain 
No time pressure  246*** 3*** 0.01*** -1.17** -1.18** 53.56%** 57.41% 
Time pressure  158 90 0.69 -1.24 -1.47 54.80% 57.78% 
Notes: Decision times reported show the sum of time used for the two subsets, S1 and S2. Total time 
constraint was 200 seconds under time pressure, and 840 seconds in the absence of time pressure. a: 
averages reported; b: numbers reflect the expected value implied by choices actually made; c: numbers 
reflect the expected value implied by all choice problems, including missing items; *,**,*** indicates 
significance of difference from time pressure condition at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. 
                                                 
10 15% majored in economics, 16% in business administration, while 10% were enrolled in other social 
sciences programs. Furthermore, 4% were psychologists, 10% majored in the humanities, 5% in law, 21% 
in the natural sciences or technology and the remaining rest 19% came from other fields. 
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 We next consider the effect of time pressure on risky decisions. The last four 
columns in Table 2 show, for time-unconstrained and for time-constrained choices, the 
average expected payoff that is implied by the choices the subject actually made, the 
average expected payoff that is implied by all choice problems including missing items 
(which count as the highest loss)11, the percentage of choices that avoid a prominent loss, 
and the percentage of choices that seek a prominent gain. The latter two percentages are 
conditional on the items that a person has answered.  
  We observe that overall, time pressure significantly reduces decision quality.12 The 
expected value (EV) implied by choices actually made is lower under time pressure. 
Additionally, missing items lead to losses and further reduce payoffs under time pressure. 
Under time pressure, participants make significantly more choices that avoid a prominent 
loss than in the absence of time pressure, at a loss of expected value. That is, choices are 
more heuristic under time pressure, being affected by salient attractive aspects of the 
lottery and sacrificing expected payoff. We observe that, despite the fact that the time 
constraint is imposed on the set level rather than the individual task level as in Kocher et 
al. (2103), our findings replicate the effects reported in their study.  
  Participants realize a lower expected value under time pressure. In the subsequent 
analyses, we consider expected value as a measure of decision quality. This interpretation 
is supported by the direct (inverse) link of expected value to heuristic choices (loss 
avoiding and gain seeking). Expected payoff is also a criterion that is applied in many 
professional settings outside the laboratory to assess decision success. However, 
participants may not necessarily aim to maximize expected value in the experiment. In 
the Web Appendix, we therefore present the main results also under the alternative 
assumption that participants’ decisions may reflect cumulative prospect theory 
                                                 
11 As a benchmark for the subsequent analyses we observe that the highest realizable expected value was €-
0.39, and the lowest was €-2.28, if all choices were actually answered. Not answering any item would yield 
an expected payoff of €-11.23.  
12 Results are even more pronounced if we only consider data in Set 1 using between-subjects comparison. 
Set 2 behavior might be influenced by experience. We discuss possible learning effects in the Web 
Appendix, section B.5. 
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preferences. In Section 5.2, we report results taking the stability of the decision process 
(based on a fitted decision model) across settings as an alternative quality criterion. 
 
4. RESULTS: IDENTIFYING SELECTION 
We first approach the question whether selection is relevant under time pressure. To this 
end, we compare those decision makers who violate the time constraint under time 
pressure (N = 90) to those who do not (N = 289). A violator is defined as a decision 
maker who ran out of time before making all 12 choices, in at least one of the two subsets 
of risky decisions in her time-constrained part. 13 Clearly, these two groups will thus 
differ under time pressure. However, the within-person design also allows us to study 
whether these groups differ when they are not time-constrained.14 
 Table 3 shows results of the comparison between the two groups for various 
measures. The left panel shows behavior in the absence of time pressure. Subjects who 
violate the time constraint differ substantially from those who do not violate the 
constraint in the way they approach the risky decision task. In terms of decision 
processes, violators use more time and distribute their time less evenly across choices. 
Moreover, violators are less affected by salient loss or gain features of the lotteries. They 
consequently perform significantly better on average in terms of the implied expected 
value of their choices than non-violators, when not exposed to time pressure. In the right 
panel of Table 3, we compare the two groups in the presence of time pressure. Also, 
under a time constraint, violators use more time and have a higher variance of time used 
across choice problems. They perform significantly worse on the full set of choices. This 
effect is driven by the relatively strong punishment for not answering a choice problem, 
                                                 
13 We do not wish to invoke normative statements with respect to violating rules by choosing the term 
violator.  
14 In section 4 and 5, we report the average treatment effects of time pressure, pooling all decisions in Set 1 
and Set 2 irrespective of order. Web Appendix B.5 provides additional analyses, reporting results based on 
either Set 1 or Set 2 data. Results do not differ qualitatively across the two sets. In Web Appendix B.4, we 
also report on a continuous measure number of items missed rather than the violator indicator. Results 
replicate results presented in the main text. 
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which they seem not to take sufficiently into consideration in their strategy. Moreover, 
under time pressure, violators do not perform better than non-violators on the choices 
they actually made. However, violators do not perform significantly worse than non-
violators on these items either. 
 Table 3: Differences between Time-constraint Violators and Non-violators 
Notes: Violator status for each subject is assigned if at least one item in at least one time-constrained 
subset was not answered; *,**,*** at the entries for non-violators indicate that these values differ 
from those for violators, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. 
a: expected value calculated on the basis of those items in the prominent gain and prominent loss 
subsets that all subjects were able to answer under time pressure. 
 
 Table 3 also shows the expected value over the set of choices for which no subject 
violated the time constraint (row five). 15 This includes the first seven choices in the 
prominent gain sets and the first three choices in the prominent loss sets. Apparently, on 
this subset of early choices, the violators perform much better than the non-violators do, 
                                                 
15 For this row, we removed one subject, a violator, from the analysis in this table, as she is the only 
participant violating the time constraint already at the fourth item for the subset of prominent gain lotteries, 
while others violate only after the seventh item. The results remain the same if we include all subjects but 
we lose a substantial amount of information for the subset of prominent gain lotteries. 
 No time pressure  Time pressure 
Performance measure Violators 
(N=90) 
Non-violators 
(N=289) 
Violators 
(N=90) 
Non-violators 
(N=289) 
Actual time used (in 
sec.)  
323.79 221.13*** 188.87 148.72*** 
Variance of time used 
per item  
77.75 37.29*** 30.82 10.30*** 
Expected value 
(choices made; €) 
-1.06 -1.21*** -1.29 -1.22 
Expected value (all 
decision problems; €) 
-1.08 -1.21*** -2.29 -1.22*** 
Expected value (items 
w/o violations; €)a 
-3.69 -3.90*** -3.68 -3.90*** 
Percent of choices 
avoiding prominent 
loss 
49.63% 54.79%* 52.72% 55.45 
Percent of choices 
seeking prominent gain 
46.96% 60.67%*** 47.95% 60.84%*** 
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and this holds true in both the time pressure and the no-time pressure condition. 
Moreover, comparing this performance measure across time pressure conditions, we 
observe that the expected payoffs do not differ for either group of decision makers (for 
both groups, p > 0.7, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Thus, under time pressure, initially the 
violators can fully implement the same decision strategy as in the absence of time 
pressure. However, in later decision items when less time is available, they lose out, 
harming their overall performance for the choices they actually make (shown in row three 
in Table 3) and even more so for the full set of choices (shown in row four in Table 3). 
Table 4: Differences between Time-constraint Violators and Non-violators across  
Choice Items under Time Pressure (Expected Value of Choices Made) 
Choice problem 
(prominent gain) 
Violators Non-Violators Choice problem 
(prominent loss) Violators Non-Violators 
1 -9.89 (N=90) -10.08 (N=289) 13 8.56 (N=90) 8.55 (N=289) 
2 -5.09 (N=90) -5.14 14 8.93 (N=90) 8.59* 
3 -12.37 (N=90) -12.56* 15 4.61 (N=90) 4.49 
4 -5.57 (N=89) -5.75** 16 8.33 (N=89) 8.30 
5 -14.17 (N=89) -14.56*** 17 6.12 (N=89) 6.15 
6 -8.94 (N=89) -9.11** 18 9.42 (N=88) 9.39 
7 -3.22 (N=89) -3.44*** 19 11.74 (N=87) 11.57 
8 -11.71 (N=87) -11.85** 20 5.61 (N=84) 5.68 
9 -9.42 (N=83) -9.70** 21 7.50 (N=77) 7.54 
10 -13.11 (N=77) -13.24 22 4.31 (N=66) 4.22 
11 -12.28 (N=63) -12.34 23 4.25 (N=47) 4.41 
12 -8.37 (N=45) -8.38 24 8.02 (N=19) 8.03 
Notes: Entries are expected values (€) of choices made; averages over participants in the subgroup; 
*,**,*** at the entries for Non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for Violators, at the 
10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, Mann-Whitney test. Number of observations in parentheses (constant 
for Non-violators).  
 
This dynamic pattern of performance is shown in more detail in Table 4. The table 
shows for each item, in the order of appearance, the implied expected value of the 
choices made by violators and non-violators under time pressure. In the set of prominent 
gains (items 1-12), violators perform better early on. In the set of prominent losses (item 
13-24), the effect is less pronounced, but points in the same direction. As they move on 
with the task, violators do not make better decisions than the non-violators anymore, 
possibly because time become scarce. This is especially true in the set with prominent 
gains. Additionally, violators at some point violate the time constraint (shown by the 
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decrease in sample sizes indicated for each choice item), leading to significant losses in 
expected value over all decision problems. We also observe that violation of the time 
constraint for prominent-loss choices leads to an additional loss of expected payoffs for 
the set of choices made. This is caused by the fact that lotteries in this subset had positive 
expected payoffs, and thus a participant’s average expected payoff over choices made is 
harmed by simply reducing the number of prominent-loss choices that are completed. 
This effect leads to the negative effect on expected value for choices actually made under 
time pressure, shown in row three of Table 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Time Use of Violators and Non-violators 
Figure 2 further illustrates different time-use strategies employed by violators and 
non-violators by plotting the average decision time they spend on each item. The strategy 
violators employed resembles the notion of “maximizer”, first discussed by Simon (1955, 
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1956) and formalized by Schwartz et al. (2002), in which decision makers only settle for 
the best option. On the other hand, non-violators seem to use a strategy in line with the 
notion of “satisficers,” who settle for an option that seems good enough. In the absence of 
time pressure (upper panel), violators clearly spend more time on each item than non-
violators, and use a substantial amount of time for some items that might be perceived as 
more difficult by them, leading to higher variance in terms of the average time-used per 
item. In the Web Appendix (Section B3) we provide additional analyses. Using panel 
regressions to explain the time used on each item in the absence of a time constraint, we 
find that violators on average use 6 seconds more on each item and that they are much 
more sensitive to the difficulty of the expected value calculation than non-violators. 
These result further support the notion that violators seem to behave as “maximizers”. 
Under time pressure (lower panel in Figure 2), violators initially use much time and then 
almost monotonically reduce their time used per item as they progress through the task.16 
Compared to the non-violators who remain relatively stable in their time use per item as 
they proceed through the task, violators thus initially use more time, and later have even 
less time than the (on average) non-violators take for the last few items. That is, given the 
significant punishment for violation of the time constraint, violators exhibit poor time 
management. 
 An important question regarding the external validity of experimental observations 
of choice behavior concerns the correlation between time-constrained and unconstrained 
behavior in at the individual level. We observe that behavior and outcomes are positively 
correlated across environments. Yet, correlations are larger for non-violators than for 
violators.17 While non-violators seem to be able to implement similar decision strategies 
both in the absence and in the presence of time pressure, violators are less able to sustain 
                                                 
16 All items that a person cannot answer because time ran out are counted as zero time used. This is 
consistent with the person having indeed used zero seconds to make the decision. Note that the non-zero 
time use for later items in each subset by each group of violators is caused by the definition of violator 
based on a violation in at least one of the two subsets. Thus, not all violators run out of time in the 
prominent gain subset (prominent loss subset).  
17 Results can be found in the Web Appendix, Table W11. 
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the same strategy in the different decision environments, especially for the last few items 
when they run out of time.  
To sum up, we document substantial selection effects under time pressure: those 
participants who cannot cope with the time constraint have very different time-use and 
decision strategies in the absence of time pressure. They make better decisions when 
sufficient time is available (i.e., under no-time pressure conditions) than those subjects 
who are not violating time-constraints under time pressure. However, under time pressure 
they are not able to sustain these strategies anymore and therefore lose out against the 
non-violators in terms of performance.  
 
5. RESULTS: TIME PRESSURE RESISTANCE – PREDICTING WHO CAN BETTER COPE 
WITH TIME PRESSURE 
5.1. The effect of observable traits: Non-parametric analyses 
Having observed that there are systematic differences in behavior between those who can 
and those who cannot cope with time pressure well, we now investigate whether there are 
observable traits or characteristics that allow predicting time pressure resistance in risky 
decision making. We observe significant lower intellectual efficiency and self-efficacy 
among violators (IE: 22.47 versus 23.27 for non-violators, SE: 28.36 versus 29.80 for 
non-violators, Mann-Whitney tests, both p<0.05). While not significant on conventional 
levels, there exist suggestive differences in gender (29.31% male versus 40.46% male for 
non-violators, Mann-Whitney test, p=0.14).18 For none of the Big Five items were there 
any differences between violators and non-violators. Moreover, in the previous section 
we have already shown the pronounced differences in time use strategies between 
violators and non-violators. In the following we therefore study the differences between 
low and high IQ, low and high IE, low and high self-efficacy, and small and large 
amounts of time used / variance of time used (in the absence of time pressure). 
Importantly, these differences are observed for all subjects, irrespective of whether they 
violate the deadline under time pressure or not. That is, we can also make use of variation 
                                                 
18 We analyze gender effects in Web Appendix B.1. 
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in performance within the groups of violators and non-violators. Below we will use these 
measures also jointly in a multivariate analysis as predictors of decision performance 
under time pressure. 
Cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency. We consider the role of IQ and IE on 
risky behavior, in time-constrained and unconstrained settings. Despite being positively 
correlated (0.5760, p<0.01, Spearman rank correlation), the correlation between IQ and 
IE is far from perfect, suggesting that the two measures capture separate traits. Since we 
are interested in outcomes and in selection effects, we report effects on the implied 
expected value from the choices made and from all choice problems, the percentage of 
time-constraint violators, the number of missing items per subject, and the incidence of 
avoiding prominent losses and seeking prominent gains. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5 report 
the results for IQ and IE. 
To allow for direct group comparisons, we split the sample at the median values of 
IQ and IE.19 As shown in the table, in the absence of time pressure, low IQ and low IE 
subjects perform worse in terms of expected payoffs, and they are affected more strongly 
by salient features of the lottery than high IQ and IE groups. These results are consistent 
with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2010). The table also 
suggests that the amount of time used by high IQ/IE subjects and relatively low IQ/IE 
subjects is similar, in both conditions.20 Interestingly, the table shows show that IQ is 
correlated with decision quality under time pressure, while IE is not. The fact that IQ 
effects remain significant under time pressure suggests that the absence of an effect for IE 
is not simply due to a larger noise under time pressure. Note that we consider univariate 
correlations, and IE and IQ may be differently affected by other variables that are related 
with behavior under time pressure (e.g., gender), which will be controlled for in the 
multivariate analyses below. 
                                                 
19 The median IQ is 10. We split the sample such that IQ < 10 defines the “low” group. The median for IE 
is 23. We split the sample such that IE < 23 defines “low” group. In Web Appendix B.4 we consider 
continuous measures as robustness checks replicating the results qualitatively. 
20 This finding might derive from high-ability participants more carefully considering the decision, and 
low-ability participants taking more time to understand the problem. 
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Self-Efficacy. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 show results for self-efficacy. Although 
self-efficacy directly measures individuals’ ability to cope with hassles, similar to IE, 
there is no raw correlation with behavior and performance under time pressure and 
without time pressure. 
 Time-use strategies. As seen before, time-use strategies differ strongly across 
subjects and correlate with violator status. Measuring the total time use and the variance 
across choice items in the conditions with no time pressure for all subjects, we confirm 
the importance of the measures. Table 6 shows strong effects on violator status and 
missing items: those who make more careful decisions (higher time use and variance) are 
more likely to violate the time constraint and miss out on answering items.21 However, 
these careful decision makers do not perform worse on average than the less careful ones. 
If they manage to meet the time constraint, they realize a higher performance. Moreover, 
more careful decision makers are less prone to salience effects and obtain higher 
expected payoffs on the choices they make. 
                                                 
21 Similar to the previous analysis, we provide continuous measures in Web Appendix section B.4. 
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Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for IQLow, IELow, and SELow indicate that these values differ from those for IQHigh, IEHigh, SEHigh, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% 
significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median IQ score is 10. The median IE score is 23. The median SE score is 29.  
Table 5: Effects of Personal Trait Measures and Performance 
 No time pressure  
(840 sec = 420+420) 
Time pressure 
(200 sec = 120 +80) 
No time pressure  
(840 sec = 420+420) 
Time pressure 
(200 sec = 120 +80) 
No time pressure  
(840 sec = 420+420) 
Time pressure 
(200 sec = 120 +80) 
Performance 
measure 
IQHigh IQLow IQHigh IQLow IEHigh IELow IEHigh IELow SEHigh SELow SEHigh SELow 
Actual time 
used (in sec.) 
257.72 228.62 159.29 156.82 250.96 237.38 157.44 159.48 357.02 230.75 158.38 158.10 
Expected value 
(choices made; 
€) 
-1.10 -1.27*** -1.14 -1.37*** -1.13 -1.24*** -1.19 -1.30 -1.17 -1.18 -1.28 -1.18 
Expected value 
(all decision 
problems; €) 
-1.11 -1.27*** -1.41 -1.56** -1.13 -1.24*** -1.42 -1.54 -1.17 -1.18 -1.47 -1.48 
Percent time-
constraint 
violators 
1.36% 0 24.09% 23.27% 1.32% 0 22.47% 25.66% 0.47% 1.20% 20.66% 27.71% 
Number of 
missing items 
per person 
0.01 0 0.70 0.68 0.01 0 0.63 0.78 0.005 0.012 0.62 0.78 
Percent of 
choices 
avoiding 
prominent loss 
49.17% 59.64%*** 50.33% 61.00%*** 49.71% 59.32%*** 51.92% 59.11%** 52.82% 54.52% 54.58% 55.08% 
Percent of 
choices 
seeking 
prominent gain 
52.17% 64.68%*** 54.56% 62.24%*** 54.56% 61.68%** 57.57% 58.09% 57.52% 57.28% 57.99% 57.50% 
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Table 6: Effects of Variance of Time Used Per Item and Total Time Used (in the 
Absence of Time Pressure) on Outcomes under Time Pressure 
Notes: *,**,*** at the entries for VARLow and TimeLow indicate that these values differ from those for VARHigh 
and TimeHigh, at the 10%, 5% , and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The median variance of 
time used per item under no time constraint is 12.74. We split the sample such that VAR < 12.74 is the low 
variance group; and Time < 201 seconds is the low time (faster) group. Total time was 200 (in time pressure 
conditions). 
 
 
5.2. Fitting a Cumulative Prospect Theory decision model 
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that observable characteristics are strongly associated with 
risky behavior in the presence and absence of time pressure. A natural question is 
whether we can link observable traits to a person’s ability to maintain her decision 
processes under a tight time constraint. To answer this question, we make use of the 
within-subject design to estimate a simplified cumulative prospect theory model (CPT, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) for each participant on the basis of her 24 time-
unconstrained choices, assuming that these unconstrained reflect her preferences. We 
then assess how successfully these preferences are implemented under time pressure.  
Predictive success is then related to observable characteristics.  
Performance measure VARHigh 
(N=189) 
VARLow  
(N=190) 
TimeHigh 
(N=191) 
TimeLow  
(N=188) 
Actual time used (in 
sec.)  
172.55 144.04*** 176.46 139.77*** 
Expected value 
(choices made; €) 
-1.15 -1.32*** -1.15 -1.32*** 
Expected value (all 
decision problems; €) 
-1.53 -1.42 -1.57 -1.37 
Percent time-constraint 
violators 
34.39% 13.16%*** 36.65% 10.64%*** 
Number of missing 
items per person 
1.06 0.33*** 1.19 0.19*** 
Percent of choices 
avoiding prominent 
loss 
50.80% 58.79%** 49.57% 60.12%*** 
Percent of choices 
seeking prominent gain 
49.73% 65.78%*** 48.74% 66.97%*** 
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Detailed methods and results are in Web Appendix A. Here we concisely state the 
main results. The fitted CPT model has good predictive power.22 The overall average 
success rate of predicting choices made under time pressure using time-unconstrained 
fitted parameters is above 65%, which is significantly better than a random prediction (p 
< 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). We find strong links between observables and 
predictive success. For decision makers with higher measures of IE, higher measures of 
self-efficacy, and less time-use in the absence of time pressure, the fitted model predicts 
behavior under time pressure more successfully than for those with lower measures in the 
respective comparison categories. For IQ and variance in decision times, we find 
insignificant results. Thus, there is clear evidence that observables relate to a person’s 
time pressure resistance. Importantly, in contrast to an evaluation based on expected 
payoffs, the current approach presumes no normative measure of success apart from 
stability of preferences between the two environments; each person is evaluated on the 
basis of her own choice behavior in the absence of time pressure, possibly showing loss 
aversion and/or probability weighting.  
 
 
5.3. Multivariate analyses 
We next provide multivariate analyses for our main dependent variables of interest. We 
study the partial correlations of IE, IQ, self-efficacy, gender, as well as our two time-use 
measures with the expected payoffs for the choices made (columns 1 and 2 in Table 7) 
and with the expected value over all choices (columns 3 and 4 in Table 7), under time 
pressure. That is, we aim to identify whether using a set of observables allows us to 
predict outcomes under time pressure. In addition, we also conduct multivariate analyses 
for predictive success of the fitted CPT model under time pressure, both for choices made 
(column 5 in Table 7) and for all decision problems (column 6 in Table 7).   
 
                                                 
22 It turns out that violators are significantly more loss averse (p<0.001) and have a lower probability 
weighting parameter (p<0.06). This suggests another pathway through which violators may differ 
systematically from non-violators.  
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Performance Measures under Time Pressure 
 
 
 
Covariates  
Expected 
value 
(choices 
made; €) 
Expected 
value 
(choices 
made; €) 
Expected 
value (all 
decision 
problems; €) 
Expected 
value (all 
decision 
problems; €) 
Predictive 
success 
(choices 
made; %) 
Predictive 
success (all 
decision 
problems; %) 
IE 0.0140 
(0.0127) 
0.0178 
(0.0128) 
0.0348 
(0.0164)** 
0.0333 
(0.0163)** 
0.0046 
(0.0032) 
0.0062 
(0.0033)* 
IQ  0.0399 
(0.0169)** 
0.0321 
(0.0175)* 
0.0019 
(0.0228) 
0.0048 
(0.0224) 
 0.0006 
(0.0050) 
-0.0008 
(0.0052) 
F-test              
IE = IQ = 0 
F=7.18*** F=5.73*** F=3.76** F=3.60** F=1.82 F=2.57* 
Self-Efficacy -0.0085 
(0.0074) 
-0.0097 
(0.0068) 
0.0036 
(0.0070) 
0.0040 
(0.0070) 
0.0026 
(0.0017) 
0.0034 
(0.0018)* 
Female -0.0414 
(0.0696) 
0.0276 
(0.0740) 
-0.0779 
(0.0863) 
-0.1067 
(0.0875) 
-0.0273 
(0.0199) 
-0.0333 
(0.0208) 
Variance of 
time used per 
item when no 
time-constraint 
 0.0001 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Total time used 
when no time-
constraint 
 0.0012 
(0.0003)*** 
 -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001)* 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 379 379 379 379 342 342 
R2 7.24% 13.95% 8.68% 9.45% 8.59% 10.34% 
Notes: Results show coefficients from OLS regressions using robust standard errors, reported in parentheses. Controls 
include swiftness on the computer (Cappelen et al., 2016) and math score. All regressions control for treatment (Table 
1); *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % significance level,  respectively.  
 The results confirm our earlier findings but show overall modest explanatory power 
of background variables for variations in expected payoff and predictive power of 
individual decision models under time pressure. IQ and IE, which are positively 
correlated, are significant predictors of expected value and predictive success. As 
expected, IE seems more relevant for all choices (including missed items), while IQ is 
more relevant for choices made. F-tests suggest that IE and IQ jointly determine the 
decision quality, with higher ability participants making better choices (EV) and more 
consistent choice across time pressure settings. Total time used in the absence of time 
pressure predicts better decisions over choices made, but lower predictive success over 
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all choices. We find no significant effect of gender. Self-Efficacy has a significant effect 
only for predictive success over all choices made. 
 Overall, we can explain only a small amount of the variance in expected value and in 
predictive success of the fitted CPT model. Although IE, IQ and time used strategy under 
unconstrained conditions are helpful in predicting decisions, our results still emphasize 
the necessity of finding better instruments to predict the ability to perform under time 
pressure.  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
We set out to study the role of selection in time-pressured decision environments, and 
how it is linked to observable characteristics of the decision maker, including those 
characteristics that can be made observable using survey and experimental techniques. 
Clearly, different decision styles play an important role. Those who can and those who 
cannot easily cope with the time constraint in risky decisions differ along various 
dimensions. People who violate time constraints, i.e. those with lower time pressure 
resistance, make more careful (more variance, more time used), and consequently more 
successful decisions (higher EV, less affected by salient outcomes) when unconstrained. 
They also initially perform better under time pressure. However, as they run out of time, 
they cannot implement their strategy anymore, leading to considerable losses. 
Consequently, their performance and behavior are also much less correlated between the 
time pressure and the no-pressure conditions than it is the case for non-violators. A fitted 
decision model on the basis of behavior in the absence of time pressure, is less predictive 
of their decisions under time pressure than is the case for non-violators. Violators try to 
make good decisions, sacrificing time, and violating the time constraint despite severe 
punishment (payment of maximum loss in the current design): they have poor time 
management. Because violators and non-violators differ on a range of characteristics, 
causal effects observed in non-violators may not be representative for the population as a 
whole.  
 The results have implications in practical contexts. Different people fit into different 
environments in terms of decision style. Making good decisions in one setting does not 
necessarily predict good decision-making in another setting. For instance, maximizers 
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who perform well given the time to thoroughly seek and compare alternatives might not 
fit well in rapid decision making environments. More problematic from a practical 
perspective is the fact that our results suggest a trade-off between good decision-making 
in adverse versus good decision-making in a less constrained decision context. For a 
position with varying environmental conditions, it might thus be difficult to find a good 
candidate.   
 In terms of predicting who performs well under time pressure, it is important to 
identify different types of individuals in terms of time pressure resistance. Our 
experiment aimed at making the differences in decision style under time pressure 
observable by considering measures of ability, personality and decision process/strategy. 
We find that various measures correlate with outcomes under time pressure and with the 
proneness to being attracted by salient features of prospects. Including these variables in 
a multivariate analysis, we identify IQ, IE and time-use in the absence of time pressure as 
moderate predictors of success under time pressure. Corroborating previous results by 
Kuhnen and Melzer (2014), self-efficacy is the only personality trait that has a weak 
systematic influence on decision-making. Overall, predictive power of observables is 
low, suggesting that we miss out important unobservable aspects of the decision 
strategies. This seems particularly important for practical applications in the workplace, 
as identifying people based on tests for cognitive abilities and standard questionnaires 
appear to be of limited use when selecting agents that should perform well under time 
pressure. More complex, experimental-based assessments of decision strategies under 
time pressure seem warranted.   
 We also obtain results regarding the determinants of risky decision strategies. The 
finding that cognitive ability relates to higher realized expected payoffs is consistent with 
the extant literature. In a representative sample of the German population, Dohmen et al. 
(2010) find that subjects with higher cognitive skills are willing to take more risks. 
Similarly, Benjamin et al. (2013) report for Chilean high school students a significant 
correlation of risk aversion and cognitive capacities. With the average participant being 
risk averse, these directional effects are consistent with higher expected payoffs in our 
setting. However, other researchers have questioned the evidence on cognitive ability and 
risk taking. Andersson et al. (2016) provide evidence that these correlations may be 
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spurious. They assert that, in fact, cognitive capacities are related to making errors and 
that the specific design of choice lists triggers the interpretation of differential risk 
attitudes. Our design does not involve choice lists, suggesting the cognitive ability effects 
are not merely driven by these design issues. However, our results suggest that the link 
between cognitive ability and risk behavior may be more moderate compared to the 
effects reported by Dohmen et al. (2010).  
 In conclusion, we find that selection is a very important factor in adverse decision 
environments. The relevance of selection effects has implications for the interpretation of 
the average laboratory behavior in terms of population parameters, and for the 
interpretation in terms of external validity of realistic decision-making scenarios 
(Ganster, 2005). We identify predictors of time pressure resistance. However, more work 
is needed to make aspects of decision style and the use of heuristics predictable. If 
behavioral measures are shown to be of limited explanatory power, neurological markers 
may provide an interesting alternative (e.g., Buckert et al., 2014; Kandasamy et al., 
2014). Identifying people’s ability to cope with time pressure is not a straightforward 
task. Tests for cognitive ability or intellectual efficiency and standard questionnaires need 
to be accompanied by additional measures. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1. Risky Behavior under Time Pressure: Summary of Results  
Table A1: Related Literature on the Effect of Time Pressure on Decisions under Risk 
 Effect of Time Pressure Potential 
Selection 
Problems? 
Weak Time 
Pressure? 
Ben-Zur and Breznitz (1981) Risk aversion ↑ No Yes 
Busemeyer (1985) Risk aversion ↓ for losses, 
Risk aversion ↑ for gains 
No No 
Dror et al. (1999) Risk aversion ↑ or ↓ (dep. on 
level of risk) 
No Yes 
Maule et al. (2000) Risk aversion ↓ for losses, no 
effect for gains 
No Yes 
Huber and Kunz (2007) Risk aversion ↓ No Yes 
Chandler and Pronin (2012) Risk aversion ↓ No Yes 
Young et al. (2012) Probability weighting ↑ (for 
gains), no effect for losses 
Yes No 
Kocher et al. (2013) Loss aversion ↑, no effect for 
gains, for mixed gambles: 
more loss averse and gain 
seeking. 
Yes No 
Nursimulu and Bossaerts (2014) Risk aversion ↓ Yes Yes 
Madan et al. (2015) Risk aversion ↓ (for gains) Yes No. 
Saqib and Chan (2015) Risk preferences reverse: risk 
seeking for gains and risk 
aversion for losses. 
Unclear No 
Hu et al. (2015) Risk aversion ↓ Unclear Unclear 
Haji et al. (2016) Risk aversion ↑ Yes No 
Kirchler et al. (2017) Risk aversion ↑ for gains, 
Risk aversion ↓ for losses 
Yes No 
Gawryluk and Krawczyk (2017) Risk aversion ↑ No Unclear 
Notes: Column 3 indicates whether due to violation of the time constraint, internal validity might not hold, 
as the sample of violators is potentially self-selected. Column 4 indicates that there was no imposition of 
substantial time pressure which led to negative payout consequences (for example a time limit that could 
not be exceeded or a time limit under which hardly anyone misses the time limit). 
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A.2. List of Binary Risky Choices 
Table A2: Lotteries Used in Risky Choice Tasks 
#Set/ 
# Lottery 
Lottery A Lottery B 
Payoff 1 Prob. 1 Payoff 2 Prob. 2 EV Payoff 1 Prob. 1 Payoff 2 Prob. 2 EV 
S1 / G1 - 19.00 27.14 % - 5.00 72.86 % - 8.80 4.50 21.50 % - 15.50 78.50 % - 11.20 
S1 / G2 - 8.00 15.00 % - 4.00 85.00 % - 4.60 3.00 15.00 % - 7.00 85.00 % - 5.50 
S1 / G3 - 16.00 23.34 % - 10.00 76.66 % - 11.40 8.50 13.00 % - 16.50 87.00 % - 13.25 
S1 / G4 - 9.00 40.00 % - 2.00 60.00 % - 4.80 7.00 40.00 % - 15.00 60.00 % - 6.20 
S1 / G5 - 15.50 30.00 % - 12.50 70.00 % - 13.40 5.50 12.08 % - 18.50 87.92 % - 15.60 
S1 / G6 - 15.00 12.00 % - 7.50 88.00 % - 8.40  5.00 27.50 % - 15.00 72.50 % - 9.50 
S1 / G7 - 7.50 14.55 % - 2.00 85.45 % - 2.80 3.00 33.33 % - 7.50 66.67 % - 4.00 
S1 / G8 - 16.00 40.00 % - 8.00 60.00 % - 11.20 4.00 10.00 % - 14.00 90.00 % - 12.20 
S1 / G9 - 15.00 28.89 % - 6.00 71.11 % - 8.60 3.50 24.86 % - 15.00 75.14 % - 10.40 
S1 / G10 - 16.00 10.00 % - 12.00 90.00 % - 12.40 6.00 10.00 % - 16.00 90.00 % - 13.80 
S1 / G11 - 15.00 15.00 % - 11.00 85.00 % - 11.60  12.00 15.00 % - 17.00 85.00 % - 12.65 
S1 / G12 - 11.00 30.00 % - 6.00 70.00 % - 7.50 5.00 30.00 % - 15.00 70.00 % - 9.00 
S1 / L1 6.50 80.62 % 14.50 19.38 % 8.05 13.50 79.00 % - 6.50 21.00 % 9.30 
S1 / L2 5.00 80.00 % 15.00 20.00 % 7.00 15.00 75.00 % - 5.00 25.00 % 10.00 
S1 / L3 3.00 76.66 % 6.00 23.34 % 3.70 10.00 72.06 % - 7.00 27.94 % 5.25 
S1 / L4 6.00 75.00 % 14.00 25.00 % 8.00 14.00 80.00 % - 12.00 20.00 % 8.80 
S1 / L5 4.50 60.00 % 7.50 40.00 % 5.70 12.50 71.25 % - 7.50 28.75 % 6.75 
S1 / L6 7.50 70.00 % 12.50 30.00 % 9.00 14.50 80.44 % - 8.50 19.56 % 10.00 
S1 / L7 9.50 81.66 % 15.50 18.34 % 10.60 14.50 87.65 % - 2.50 12.35 % 12.40 
S1 / L8 4.00 75.00 % 9.00 25.00 % 5.25 14.00 70.00 % - 11.00 30.00 % 6.50 
S1 / L9 6.00 70.00 % 10.00 30.00 % 7.20 12.50 84.00 % - 15.00 16.00 % 8.10 
S1 / L10 2.00 65.00 % 7.00 35.00 % 3.75 7.00 85.00 % - 7.00 15.00 % 4.90 
S1 / L11 2.00 65.00 % 5.00 35.00 % 3.05 10.00 70.00 % - 5.00 30.00 % 5.50 
S1 / L12 5.00 75.00 % 15.00 25.00 % 7.50 10.00 90.00 % - 4.00 10.00 % 8.60 
S2 / G1 - 20.00 30.00 % - 4.00 70.00 % - 8.80 4.00 20.00 % - 15.00 80.00 % - 11.20 
S2 / G2 - 8.00 32.00 % - 3.00 68.00 % - 4.60 4.00 13.64 % - 7.00 86.36 % - 5.50 
S2 / G3 - 15.00 10.00 % - 11.00 90.00 % - 11.40 8.00 15.00 % - 17.00 85.00 % - 13.25 
S2 / G4 - 10.00 30.67 % - 2.50 69.33 % - 4.80 7.00 41.33 % - 15.50 58.67 % - 6.20 
S2 / G5 - 15.00 20.00 % - 13.00 80.00 % - 13.40 6.00 10.00 % - 18.00 90.00 % - 15.60 
S2 / G6 - 14.00 20.00 % - 7.00 80.00 % - 8.40 4.00 25.00 % - 14.00 75.00 % - 9.50 
S2 / G7 - 6.00 20.00 % - 2.00 80.00 % - 2.80 3.00 30.00 % - 7.00 70.00 % - 4.00 
S2 / G8 - 17.00 31.76 % - 8.50 68.24 % - 11.20 4.50 12.11 % - 14.50 87.89 % - 12.20 
S2 / G9 - 14.00 40.00 % - 5.00 60.00 % - 8.60 4.00 20.00 % - 14.00 80.00 % - 10.40 
S2 / G10 - 16.00 20.00 % - 11.50 80.00 % - 12.40 6.50 9.78 % - 16.00 90.22 % - 13.80 
S2 / G11 - 15.50 29.10 % - 10.00 70.90 % - 11.60 11.00 14.00 % - 16.50 86.00 % - 12.65 
S2 / G12 - 12.00 30.77 % - 5.50 69.23 % - 7.50 5.00 26.31 % - 14.00 73.69 % - 9.00 
S2 / L1 7.00 85.00 % 14.00 15.00 % 8.05 12.00 85.00 % - 6.00 15.00 % 9.30 
S2 / L2 4.50 72.22 % 13.50 27.78 % 7.00 13.50 80.56 % - 4.50 19.44 % 10.00 
S2 / L3 3.00 65.00 % 5.00 35.00 % 3.70 9.00 75.00 % - 6.00 25.00 % 5.25 
S2 / L4 6.50 82.35 % 15.00 17.65 % 8.00 15.00 77.86 % - 13.00 22.14 % 8.80 
S2 / L5 5.00 65.00 % 7.00 35.00 % 5.70 12.00 75.00 % - 9.00 25.00 % 6.75 
S2 / L6 8.00 80.00 % 13.00 20.00 % 9.00 15.00 80.00 % - 10.00 20.00 % 10.00 
S2 / L7 10.00 85.00 % 14.00 15.00 % 10.60 14.00 90.00 % - 2.00 10.00 % 12.40 
S2 / L8 3.50 70.83 % 9.50 29.17 % 5.25 14.00 70.59 % - 11.50 29.41 % 6.50 
S2 / L9 6.00 60.00 % 9.00 40.00 % 7.20 12.00 85.00 % - 14.00 15.00 % 8.10 
S2 / L10 3.00 85.00 % 8.00 15.00 % 3.75 8.00 80.63 % - 8.00 19.37 % 4.90 
S2 / L11 2.50 78.00 % 5.00 22.00 % 3.05 11.50 64.71 % - 5.50 35.29 % 5.50 
S2 / L12 4.50 66.66 % 13.50 33.34 % 7.50 11.00 82.86 % - 3.00 17.14 % 8.60 
   Notes: Payoffs and expected values in €; S=set; G=prominent gain; L prominent loss 
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A.3. Graphical Presentation of Risky Choices 
 
 
 
A.4. Incentivization of Cognitive Ability Tasks 
The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized in the following way. In each task we count the 
number of correct items. This number then determines the probability to win a fixed prize 
of €10 in the IQ and of €20 in the IE task. The probability is calculated as P(win €10) = 
(Number of correct items +1)/(12+1) in the IQ task; and as P(win €20)= (Number of 
correct items +1)/(34+1) in the IE task. That is, subjects have a clear incentive to solve as 
many items as possible, since their expected payoff is monotonically increasing in the 
number of correct items. At the same time, they always have a positive probability of 
winning the prize.  
 The procedure was chosen to make sure that participants could never draw clear 
conclusions regarding their score or regarding the correct answer of single items. We 
wanted to avoid such inference because we did not want subjects to draw strong inference 
regarding their cognitive ability from our experiment. Note that subjects learned about 
the outcome of the random payment draw only at the end of the experiment if either Part 
1 or Part 4 were randomly selected for real payment.  
